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Despite a variety of measures taken by high tax countries, the interna-
tional fight against tax havens so far remained rather ineffective. This paper
introduces lobbying as a possible explanation for this observation. I analyze
the international fight against tax havens in a two country model in which
the onshore country exerts pressure on domestic profit shifting firms and the
low tax country lobbies against this measure. In this framework, I find that
pressure and lobbying are strategic substitutes and that there is an extensive
margin incentive for offshore lobbying. I also show that an increase in inter-
national integration leads to a decrease in the level of profit shifting, when
starting out at high levels of international frictions. Finally, when allowing
for a second low tax jurisdiction, the overall level of lobbying increases, but
less than proportionally, as free-riding occurs.
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1. Introduction
In their concluding report for the 2017’s G20 Summit, the respective country leaders
stressed once again the importance of international tax and financial cooperation (G20
2017, p. 7-8). In particular, they mention that non-compliant countries, with respect to
international tax information exchange, will be put on blacklists. These blacklists are a
widely used tool in the fight against tax evasion and profit shifting.
For example, in December 2017, the European Union launched its own blacklist for
non cooperative jurisdictions. As of February 2018, nine countries are still found on this
list.1 Initially, the blacklist consisted of seventeen countries, eight of which were removed
by late January 2018. Panama was among these eight countries.2 A country which was
at the center of public debate in 2016, when investigative journalists disclosed documents
from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonsecka that used lax regulations to help both
firms and individuals to avoid and eventually evade onshore taxation. To be removed
from the blacklist, the eight countries only had to make sufficient commitments, backed
by letters from high political level, to address previously identified shortcomings (See
European Commission 2018). There is no report on additional measure that were taken
by either of these eight countries.3
In contrast, academic authors have provided empirical evidence for adjustment re-
sponses by international investors and therefore limited efficiency of instruments such
as blacklists. Johannesen and Zucman (2014) provide evidence for shifting reactions by
French deposits from Switzerland to tax havens after the signing of a tax treaty. P.
Caruana-Galizia and M. Caruana-Galizia (2016) find such adjustment processes for the
European Savings Directive. More specifically, they find a substitution effect in owner-
ship from EU ownership towards non-EU ownership structures following the introduction
of the Directive. A third example is given by Gorea (2015), who identifies substitution
effects toward other opaque countries if a tax haven signed a tax treaty with the United
States.
Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence regarding international lobbying, especially
within supranational institutions. News reports state that several countries within the
European Union were reluctant to move forward on talks about a common consolidated
corporate tax base (CCCTB), another tool in the fight against intra-EU profit shifting
(Smith-Meyer 2017). Generally, the institutional setup of the Council of the European
Union is prone to internal lobbying, as proposals on tax matters require unanimity.4
1These countries are American Samoa, Bahrain, Guam, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Palau, Saint Lucia,
Samoa and Trinidad and Tobago. As of June 2017, the OECD’s blacklist only consisted of one
country that was deemed non-compliant: Trinidad and Tobago. See also OECD (2017).
2The other countries removed from the list were Barbados, Grenada, the Republic of Korea, Macao
SAR, Mongolia, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.
3Besides blacklists, there are additional tools for onshore countries that are used in the fight against
tax havens. Other instruments include (bilateral) tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs),
the European Savings Directive that ensures taxation of EU-cross-border interest income for private
individuals, or the OECD’s “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (OECD 2013a,b).
4See Boffey (2016) for an example on Great Britain’s opposition to put one of its oversea territories
onto the EU blacklist.
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I aim to explain this discrepancy between the multitude of measures used and their
apparent ineffectiveness by employing a theoretical two country model with a three stage
game. The main argument is that offshore lobbying, which to my knowledge has thus
far not been considered in the theoretical literature, could be another reason for the
empirical results and the anecdotal evidence presented.
At the core of this model are two simultaneous choices by the tax revenue maximizing
governments that are in stage one and two of the game: The onshore and the offshore
country decide about their level of pressure and lobbying respectively, before setting tax
rates. Finally, firms with heterogeneous shifting costs decide whether to engage in profit
shifting or not.
The onshore government faces two main trade offs. The first one is between setting a
higher tax rate to increase revenue, which in turn induces firms to shift profits abroad.
The second trade off is associated with the level of pressure set by the onshore govern-
ment. Higher levels of pressure keep the firms within the onshore country’s boundary
but lead to higher costs that reduce net tax revenue. The offshore country faces similar
trade offs: Increasing its lump sum fee makes the country relatively less attractive for
onshore multinationals but it increases tax revenues per profit shifting firm. Further-
more, engaging in costly lobbying effort leads to more firms bringing profits into the
country.
The main results of the model are as follows. There exists an extensive margin incen-
tive for tax havens to engage in international lobbying against pressure, when the onshore
country does not fully commit to eliminate profit shifting. Then, the first marginal unit
of lobbying is beneficial. Each unit of lobbying reduces the marginal benefit of pressure
for the onshore country, which leads to lower levels of pressure, resulting in more profit
shifting firms. However, if the onshore country commits to eliminate profit shifting,
engaging in costly lobbying reduces tax revenue without attracting any taxable profits
and thus offshore countries abstain from using the lobbying tool.
Furthermore, when starting at initially low levels of international integration, I find
that an increase in integration, as modeled by a decrease in financial frictions, leads to
a reduction in the number of profit shifting firms. As the decline in frictions leads to a
proportionally higher reduction in the onshore tax rate relative to the reduction in firm
specific shifting costs, the marginal firm now finds it optimal to stay onshore rather than
to shift profits offshore. The tax rate differential is not sufficiently large to attract this
firm anymore, even with lower firm level shifting costs.
When generalizing the model to allow for a second tax haven, the resulting equilibrium
pressure level for the onshore country is higher, as the marginal benefit of applying
pressure rises. Hence, reducing the number of tax havens can safe the onshore country
money. Concerning the tax havens, the overall level of lobbying is higher, while each
country’s lobbying level falls. The lower country specific level is driven by free-riding.
However, the free-riding effect is smaller in size than the mechanical effect of another
country joining the lobbying effort.
This analysis is related to three strands of the literature. Firstly, this paper is linked
to the literature that discusses international taxation and interest groups. Chu et al.
(2015) argue whether the welfare enhancing properties of tax havens are still valid in
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the presence of lobbying.5 They furthermore point out that restricting profit shifting
abilities might indeed reduce onshore welfare. Additionally, Lai (2010) shows how na-
tional interest groups may lead to a rise in capital tax rates following a capital market
integration. More generally, Janeba and Schjelderup (2009) show how welfare effects of
tax competition are dependent on the national political institutions.6
A second strand this paper relates to concerns the various measures used against
profit shifting. Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) are two seminal contributions
with respect to tax information exchange agreements. In their paper from 1995, the
authors find that for repeated games, information sharing between governments might
be optimal. In their contribution from 2000, they show that in the presence of various
reasonable conditions, no exchange agreement of any kind will be reached. Elsayyad
(2012) examines the determinants of TIEAs in a generalized Nash bargaining model
with cost free onshore pressure. More recently, Dharmapala (2016) examined the effects
of the unilateral Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act by the United States.7
Onshore pressure policies, i.e. blacklisting and “naming and shaming”, are additional
tools in the fight against tax havens and have also been discussed. Picard and Pieretti
(2011) look at pressure conditions under which offshore financial centers voluntarily com-
ply to monitor their investment. A more general point is made by Elsayyad and Konrad
(2012). In their theoretical contribution, they argue why a “big-bang-approach” is more
efficient than the sequential approach of closing down tax havens, when facing interna-
tionally mobile profits. Konrad and Stolper (2016) stress the importance of individual
beliefs in the fight against tax havens. Pieretti and Pulina (2017) have introduced pres-
sure policies as an additional instrument in the fight against tax havens. They argue
that real economic activity by onshore multinationals can be sufficiently important for
their home government, such that the efficient level of pressure lies below the level that
would eliminate profit shifting. The present model builds on the approach by Pieretti
and Pulina (2017) but it introduces lobbying by the tax haven to counteract the effects
of onshore pressure policies.
Thirdly, there is the empirical literature on the importance of tax havens in interna-
tional taxation. Desai et al. (2008) argue that tax haven affiliates used by American
firms mainly serve two intertwined goals: the aim to allocate taxable income in low-tax
jurisdictions and to avoid home country taxation of this income. More generally, Zuc-
man (2013) shows that three-quarters of wealth found in tax havens is off the record and
thereby evades taxation. Most recently, Zucman et al. (2017) estimate the global tax
5If tax havens exhibit positive or negative welfare effects is debated as well: Hong and Smart (2010)
find that tax havens create the welfare enhancing possibility for international tax planing. Rose
and Spiegel (2007) find that offshore financial centers can have pro-competitive effects on onshore
monopolists and Picard and Pieretti (2011) find positive effects for institutional competition. In
contrast, Slemrod and Wilson (2009) explain that the presence of tax havens is welfare diminishing.
6In a similar vein, Lockwood and Makris (2006) argue that the political decision process might indeed
lead to a higher tax rate, following capital market integration.
7Empirical contributions in this respect are from Ligthart and Voget (2009) and Bilicka and Fuest
(2014). While the latter paper examines the determinants of tax information exchange agreements
between countries, the former looks at the determinants for information exchange requests from
Dutch tax offices.
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revenue loss due to profit shifting to tax havens to be at roughly e 200 billion. Lastly,
Alstadsæter et al. (2017) stress the role that tax havens have in fueling wealth inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following Section introduces
the model, its results and the comparative statics. Section 3 gives an extension to the
model by incorporating a second tax haven, before Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
The model contains two countries H and F , denoting the onshore and the offshore
country respectively. Furthermore, there is a continuum of firms, all residing in H. The
firms differ in their reluctance to conduct profit shifting activity, which is captured by
the cost parameter xi for firm i. This characteristic is uniformly distributed over the
(0, 1)-interval with density dF (x).
A firm that wants to offshore profits also faces transaction costs, e.g. due to internal
restructuring, amounting to kxi, where k > 0 represents an inverse measure of interna-
tional financial integration. The higher k, the more frictions are present in the financial
market.
If a given firm decides to offshore profits, these profits only face a fixed fee ft ≥ 0
offshore. This is set by the tax haven’s government and represents filing costs and the
like. In contrast, in the onshore country, there is a proportional tax rate t ∈ [0; 1] for
profits. There is no coordination between the two countries about their tax rates.
Furthermore, the domestic country decides about a level of pressure α > 0 that is
applied to all firms that engage in profit shifting activities. This comes at quadratic
costs in the amount of α
2
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g, where g represents an inverse efficiency parameter of pressure.
Assuming that exerting the first unit of pressure is quite easy as multiple measures are
still available, marginal costs rise with the number of different measures used.8
On the contrary, the offshore country decides about how much to lobby. In this
context, lobbying is mainly motivated by the setup of most international organizations.
Usually, they require a certain threshold among their members for directives or pieces
of legislation to pass. For example, in the Council of the European Union, unanimity
is required for proposals that touch upon taxation. Lobbying by a tax haven can be
thought of as having a seat at this table and thereby influencing the policy outcome,
leading to a decrease in onshore pressure. Anecdotal evidence supports this.9 Obviously,
8One way to think about this pressure is decreasing stock prices for firms that are in the news for using
tax avoidance strategies. See Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) for a study implicating that stock prices
decrease if a firm’s aggressive tax behavior is covered in a major news outlet. A second way is to
force tax havens to sign TIEAs. Following the introduction of the EU’s blacklist, Pierre Moscovici,
the EU Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation, and Customs proposed such
an approach (see European Commission 2017).
9For example, Smith-Meyer (2017) reports that several countries within the EU, namely the U.K, Swe-
den and Ireland were reluctant to move forward on talks about the common consolidated corporate
tax base (CCCTB), one tool in the course of action against intra-EU profit shifting. Additionally,
Boffey (2016) reports on Great Britain’s opposition to put its own oversea territory Bermuda, one of









Figure 1: Setup of the game
lobbying is not limited to international institutions only but is also present in bilateral
relationships, especially so when the domestic country assumes that the tax haven has
a sizeable amount of domestic deposits or enjoys good governance.10
In the model, the level of lobbying is inversely given by γ ∈ [0; 1], which diminishes the
effective pressure costs endured by firms. The lower γ, the more lobbying takes place.
Hence, the effective pressure level endured by firms amounts to αγ. The associated costs
for lobbying are given by (1−γ)
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ρ, where ρ is an inverse efficiency measure.
The timing of the model can be seen in Figure 1. In the first stage, governments choose
pressure and lobbying, before deciding about tax rates in the second stage. Firms decide
in the last stage. This structure is intended to reflect the long term dimension of the
decision to become a tax haven. The extent of tax competition following the decision
to be a tax haven, given by the tax difference, is a of second order and should therefore
succeed the pressure and lobbying decision.11
Furthermore, assuming simultaneity for the first two stages is a natural assumption.
Any sequential setup that yields a first mover advantage would need an outside the model
justification. It remains questionable whether economically relevant onshore countries
move first and offshore countries react by lobbying (or setting taxes) afterwards or if
tax officials agreed with Google on back taxes of £130 million for estimated £7.2 billion in profits
over the previous decade.
10Elsayyad (2012) examines this in a generalized Nash-bargaining setup.
11Additionally, one can argue that international policies are more time intensive and are therefore more
long term in nature. Hence, the sequence of deciding about national policies at a later stage seems
sensible.
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well-organized tax havens anticipate the offshore pressuring (tax rate). Thus, I assume
simultaneity. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction starting with the last
stage.
2.1. Third stage: Firms’ decisions
In the last stage of the game, firms take the policy parameters as given and only decide
whether or not to shift profits abroad. It is assumed that the gross income of any firm
is given by Π = sπx + hπx, where s represents the immobile share of profits and h the
mobile share of profits. Hence, it holds that s+ h = 1.
For the purpose of tax planing, the multinational firm compares the different payoffs:
When shifting profits abroad the net profit is V Fx = πx − ft − kxi − αγ. The effective
level of pressure diminishes the firm’s profit directly. The profit in the domestic country
is the profit net of the proportional tax: V Hx = (1 − t)πx. Without loss of generality, I
assume that πx = 1.
Equalizing these two net profit functions yields the marginal profit shifting firm x,
given by
x =
t− ft − αγ
k
. (1)
As seen above, the number of profit shifting firms is positively linked with the tax rate
differential t− ft. The higher it is, the more firms engage in profit shifting. For higher
levels of effective pressure αγ and for more frictions in the financial market k, less firms
shift their profits abroad.
It is noteworthy that reactions to changes in the tax rate differential and the effective
pressure are scaled by the financial market frictions k. The higher is k, the lower is the
reaction to a change in these parameters. Hence, the higher is k, the lower is each firm’s
elasticity with respect to changes in the tax rates and the effective pressure.
2.2. Second stage: Tax rates
In the second stage, both countries decide upon the respective tax rates t and ft.
Given that firms try to minimize their tax burden by shifting profits, which is associated
with tax revenue losses for the onshore country, I assume a Leviathan objective function
for the onshore government. While this is a simplification, it implies that for the subset
of corporate profits shifted to other country’s, the onshore country cares only about
repatriating these tax revenues. For other source of tax revenue, the onshore government
might pursuit objective functions that take into account onshore citizens’ utility. As
there are no firms residing in the tax haven, I also assume a tax revenue maximizing
strategy for the offshore country, as this is the most important way to generate funds
for this government.
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The tax revenue in equation (2) is dependent on the immobile share of profits s and
the mobile shares h that remain in the country. This is then multiplied by the onshore
country’s proportional tax rate t. Pressure is costly and has to be deducted from the
tax revenue.
Applying the uniform distribution property for x, plugging in the equilibrium value x

















+ ft + αγ
)
. (3b)
The onshore country’s best response function is positively dependent on the level of
financial frictions k. As lower levels of integration make profit shifting less attractive,
the onshore country moves closer to full taxation of profits. This is however scaled by
the mobile share of capital, h. For high levels of h, i.e. a high share of mobile profits,
the effect of frictions on the best response tax rate is smaller compared to lower levels
of h. Hence, the onshore country cares about the size of mobile profits. As both the
offshore country’s fee ft and the effective pressure level αγ diminish the incentives to
shift profits offshore, the onshore country’s best response tax rate increases.

















The first part represents the income from the lump-sum tax for onshore profit shifting
activity. The second term are the convex lobbying costs that arise. Again, applying the




















As is seen by equations (5a) and (3a), the tax rates are strategic complements. When
plugging one into another, the equilibrium values for both tax rates, t∗ and f ∗t can be
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The comparative statics for these results are quite intuitive. The offshore country’s
tax rate decreases with increasing effective pressure αγ in order to offset the negative
effect that an increase of pressure has on the number of profit shifting firms. Quite the
opposite holds for the onshore country. More effective pressure leads to higher levels of
t. If the marginal firm now stays onshore, due to higher αγ, there is some leeway to
increase tax revenue by increasing the tax rate.
The level of shiftable profits h is negatively correlated with both tax rates. An increas-
ing amount of shiftable profits exerts downwards pressure on onshore tax rates. This
is seen by inspection of equation (3b). When a large part of the possible tax base is
mobile, having a higher tax rate leads to more profits being shifted. Hence, the onshore
country reduces its tax rate.
Interestingly, for higher levels of financial frictions, both tax rates rise. This is due
to two effects. Firstly, an increase in k increases every firm’s costs of shifting profits
offshore. Hence, the previously marginal firm now stays onshore. This leads to a pure
positive income effect on onshore tax revenue without a change in the tax rate. However,
as pointed out previously, an increase in k reduces the elasticity of firms with respect
the policy parameters. Therefore, the onshore country finds it optimal to increase the
tax rate t further.
For the offshore country, the effect is the opposite. An increase in k reduces the
number of firms and leads to a mechanical decrease in tax revenues. However, as the
onshore country increases its tax rate, the offshore country can raise its fee as well, while
remaining attractive for onshore profit shifting firms.
Finally, x can be simplified for further use by plugging in the values obtained in (6)








The non-negativity constraint for the tax rate in equation (6) and the requirement for
a non-negative number of profit shifting firms in equation (7) gives the upper limit of
pressure at αup = k
h
.12
2.3. First stage: Pressure and lobbying
Turning now to the first stage of the game, by incorporating previous results, the
onshore country’s tax revenue function can be rewritten to




























































In order to have meaningful results, a sufficiently high level of social costs for applying
pressure is assumed, i.e. g > 2γ
2h
9k
. This assumption is sensible, when for example
following the arguments by Schjelderup (2016). Tax havens provide secrecy services
and therefore increase the costs for onshore governments to tax onshore multinationals’
profits. It is a quite regular phenomenon that multinationals adapt their profit shifting
tactics, once a previous loophole has been found and closed by the onshore government.
Therefore, applying pressure is inherently costly.
If the pressure tool is too cheap, i.e. g < 2γ
2h
9k
, then the benefits of applying further
pressure would always outweigh the costs (as is seen in equation (9a)) and lead to the
boundary solution of x = 0.
















































For this equilibrium level of lobbying to be within the interval between zero and
one, sufficiently high costs of lobbying for the offshore country are assumed.13 When
examining (11b) one can see that if α = αup = k
h
, the second term vanishes. However,
13See section A.1 in the Appendix for more information on this.
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for α < αup, the second term is larger then zero and there exists an extensive margin
incentive for the offshore country to conduct lobbying. This is summarized in Proposition
1:
Proposition 1. Given that the onshore country cannot commit to fully eliminate profit
shifting, there is an extensive margin incentive for the offshore country to engage in
lobbying against the onshore country’s pressure.
Intuitively, the result is not surprising. Given that the onshore country commits to
eliminate profit shifting with setting αup, there is no tax revenue from profit shifting. En-
gaging in costly lobbying activities is therefore strictly dominated by not doing anything,
i.e. γ = 1.
If this not the case, at least the first marginal unit of lobbying is beneficial for the off-
shore country. Hence, given that the onshore country does not fully commit to eliminate
profit shifting, offshore lobbying is worthwhile. While this result was in a two-country
setup, section 3 examines whether there are additional effects if there are multiple tax
havens involved. For now, the comparative statics of this model is also insightful.
2.4. Comparative statics
As regards comparative statics, the change in financial integration (k) as well as an
efficiency change in the offshore cost effectiveness (ρ) and the onshore costs (g) are
examined. As the previous results are not given explicitly, the implicit function theorem
is applied.














































Throughout, I assume that direct effects outweigh indirect effects and thus |D| > 0.14
Onshore cost efficiency g As regards the onshore pressure costs, comparative static
results are in line with regular expectations. As seen in equation (13), an increase in the












































< 0 . (13)
For the offshore country, the result is the opposite. An increase in the other country’s
policy instrument and the associated decrease of its usage leads to an increase in the
14See A.2 in the Appendix for more comments.
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< 0 . (14)
Offshore cost efficiency ρ The effect for an increase in the costs for offshore lobbying





















> 0 . (15)
Remembering that the first cell in the top left corner is negative, it holds that the
main diagonal is positive. Hence, the overall effect is positive, i.e. there is less lobbying.
Thus, if the policy instrument becomes more expensive, the government is reluctant to





















> 0 . (16)
An increase in the level of offshore lobbying costs increases the level of onshore pres-
sure. The onshore country anticipates the lower level of lobbying and therefore finds it
optimal to apply more pressure to keep more firms within its boundary.
To sum those two parts up, it is striking to see that the level of pressure and the level
of lobbying are strategic substitutes. If the cost for one policy parameter increases, the
respective measures is used less intensively. In turn, the other country’s measure is used
more intensively. Along the arguments from Bulow et al. (1985), a decrease of the other
country’s policy tool due to higher costs leads to an increase in the marginal benefit
for the country not affected by the cost increase. Hence, the latter finds it beneficial to
increase the use of its policy parameter until the first order condition holds again. In
different words, an increase in one country’s cost of the policy tool is directly affecting
its own marginal benefit and indirectly affecting the other country’s marginal benefit..
Financial integration k The most interesting comparative statics result is by looking
at a change in frictions in the international financial market, hence a change in k.15 For


























< 0 . (17)
15Note that I consider an increase in financial frictions (increase in k), the opposite is true for a
decrease in financial frictions, a decrease in k. The latter is what people usually refer to as economic
integration.
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Note that the equilibrium tax rate t∗ as given by equation (6) is an increasing function
in k. Therefore, if k increases, so does the onshore tax rate, which in turn increases each
firm’s incentive for shifting profits. This increase in t∗ for all firms outweighs the cost
increase in firm specific costs kxi that has made the marginal firm abstaining from profit


























< 0 . (18)
For the offshore country, the effect is opposite. An increase in the financial frictions
makes the offshore country relatively attractive, as the tax rate differential t−ft increases.
Hence, there are more incentives for onshore firms to shift profits. Nonetheless, the




> 0, as seen in equation (6). This
increase in tax revenue releases further funds for increasing lobbying and thus makes the
offshore country even more attractive.
Obviously, the effects are reversed for reductions in k. This means that with a higher
degree of globalization, the onshore country intensifies its pressure ( ∂α
∗
∂−k
> 0) and the
offshore country lobbies less ( ∂γ
∗
∂−k
> 0). This is particularly interesting, when one looks
at the number of firms that are engaged in profit shifting and how this changes with
higher levels of globalization.
Number of profit shifting firms The effect of financial integration on the equilibrium


































⋚ 0 . (19c)
As seen above, the resulting effect is crucially dependent on the existing level of
financial market frictions k. Remember that there are two effects at work, when k
decreases. Firstly, the elasticity of firms with respect to the tax rate increases and
thus, the onshore country will set a lower tax rate. Secondly, there is a mechanical cost
reduction effect on the firm level, as kxi falls. While the first leads the firms to stay
onshore, the second one does the opposite. Hence there exists a cut-off point k̂ below










Therefore, international integration need not necessarily be bad for the onshore coun-
try. When the indirect effect associated with international integration, namely a lower
tax rate, is sufficiently larger than the direct cost reduction for firms, then there is a
possibility for a lower number of profit shifting firms. On the contrary, when the effect
of a reduction in k on the individual firm level (via the heterogeneous costs) outweighs
the effect of the change in economic environment, there will be more profit shifting. This
is true for a reduction of low values of k. This is summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. If the level of international frictions is sufficiently large, k > k̂, a
marginal reduction in frictions decreases the number of profit shifting firms. On the
contrary, if k < k̂, more financial integration results in a higher number of profit shifting
firms.
3. Multiple tax havens
3.1. General remarks and third stage
While the previous section has been insightful to analyze fundamental issues for one
tax haven, it is worthwhile to consider a more generalized setup by allowing for a second
tax haven. The main question now is whether the sum of the individual country’s
lobbying levels is larger than the lobbying effort in the initial setup. Furthermore,
the second insight is to examine whether the onshore country’s pressure level rises or
decreases, relative to the case with one tax haven.
To this end, I employ a generalized version of the previous model. Now, firm profits
are divided up between three countries. There is a fraction s that is immobile and two
shares h1 and h2 that are bilaterally mobile to the respective tax havens Fl and Fm,
m, l = (1, 2).16 It holds that 1 = s+ h1 + h2.






, indicating the firm specific costs of shifting parts of their profits to either of the
two tax havens.17 For the sake of simplicity, I assume that financial frictions are the
same worldwide. Furthermore, I assume that the pressure exerted cannot be varied on
the country level. While this is a restricting assumption, there are valid reasons why
countries cannot discriminate between tax havens.18 The potential profits of each firm
16I abstract from fully mobile profit shares. See e.g. Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) for the examination
of a very closely related case with fully mobile capital.
17I do not assume any form of correlation between the two cost parameters within a firm.
18When looking at country’s on blacklists, such as the OECD’s, there is no way to discriminate between
countries that are within one category such as e.g. being “non-compliant”. Secondly, as regards
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Figure 2: Distribution of firms into the different profit shifting schemes
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(21)
where the cutoffs are given by
x1 =
t− ft1 − αγ1
k
, x2 =
t− ft2 − αγ2
k
. (22)
The intuition for the different profits in equation (21) is fairly obvious. As the profit
shifting decision into one country is distinct from the shifting decision into the second
country, firms will face a choice set of four actions.
When the firm is neither efficient in shifting profits into haven one nor into haven two,
all profits will remain in the onshore country (first line). The second line describes the
case in which the firm finds it optimal to shift some profits to F1 but not to F2. The
third line represents just the opposite case. In the last case, firms shift all mobile profits
to the respective haven. Thus, only the complete immobile share of profits remains at
home. This is summarized graphically in Figure 2.
3.2. Second and first stage

















s+ (1− x1)h1 + (1− x2)h2)
]
. (23b)
There are now two different mobile parts of the onshore multinational’s profit that
have weights h1 and h2. For the individual tax haven l, the welfare function looks very
















Solving for the first order conditions and the plugging in the equilibrium values into
one another yields the optimal onshore tax rate t̃∗ and the optimal offshore lump sum

















The equilibrium onshore tax rate t̃∗ is still positively associated with higher levels of
effective pressure. It is however striking that the individual offshore lump sum fee for
country l is now also dependent on the actions by country m. When assuming symmetric
countries in terms of their lobbying, i.e. γm = γl, then the negative spillover on the fee
by country l prevails, as the interior bracket turns negative. However, when countries
are quite different and residing lobbying levels vary such that 3γl > γm, then there is an
overall positive effect from the other country.19 Put differently, the high lobbying effort
by country l allows tax haven m to increase its lump sum fee.














For the equilibrium number of profit shifting firms, there is again a spillover effect
of the other country’s lobbying. For the benchmark case of symmetric tax havens,
i.e. γl = γm, the bracket remains positive, i.e. the positive effect of the own lobbying
19For example, it might be the case that there is one tax haven which has significantly low costs of
lobbying and therefore lobbies quite intensively. The offshore country with high costs benefits from
this by being able to set a higher lump sum fee.
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prevails. However, when the difference in lobbying levels is rather pronounced, γm > 3γl,
the bracket becomes negative.
Note that this bracket is reversed to the interior bracket seen in equation (25). This
is quite intuitive. Assuming that γm > 3γl, i.e. country l experiences a large spillover
effect for the lump sum fee, thus it finds it optimal to raise this fee. In turn, this reduces
the number of firms that shift profits to this country, as higher fees make profit shifting
to this shore less attractive. This last point is observed in equation (27). Furthermore,
note that equation (27) nests the single tax haven number of profit shifting firms as given
by equation (7), when we assuming equal lobbying levels (γl = γm) and h = hl + hm.
When turning to the first stage of the game, I assume symmetric offshore countries for
the sake of simplicity. Symmetry hereby refers to both countries enjoying the same share
of attainable profits, hm = hl, and the same cost effectiveness of lobbying, ρl = ρm. This
in turn implies that both countries will set the same level of lobbying. Hence, examining
one tax haven is sufficient. Following the tax revenue maximization approaches given in
equations (23) and (24), this yields the following level of offshore lobbying, γ̃∗, that is





Furthermore, the equilibrium pressure level of the onshore country for the case of









3.3. Comparison to the single tax haven case
As the equilibrium values of pressure and lobbying in the presence of multiple tax
havens are given, a comparison whether these levels are larger or smaller in size is
insightful.

















As is seen in equation (30), for a given level of lobbying, the level of pressure ap-
plied in the two tax haven case is higher than in the case with only one tax haven.
Mathematically, this is seen by the smaller denominator for α̃∗ relative to α∗.
As onshore pressure and offshore lobbying are strategic substitutes, there is an incen-
tive for the onshore government to set a higher level of pressure, when facing multiple
tax havens. This is as an increase in onshore lobbying now reduces the marginal benefit
of lobbying for more than one tax haven. Therefore, a higher level of pressure relative
to the case with only one tax havens is used. Proposition 3 summarizes this:
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Proposition 3. For a given aggregate level of lobbying by two symmetric offshore coun-
tries, there is more pressure applied by the onshore country relative to a case with only
one tax haven.
Equilibrium lobbying level Equally interesting is how the equilibrium value of lobbying







= γ∗ . (31)
For a given level of pressure α, there is less lobbying per country, γ̃∗ is larger, in the
case with multiple tax havens than in the case with one tax haven. However, it can be
shown that the aggregate level of lobbying still increases (2(1− γ̃∗) ≥ (1− γ∗)). This is
summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. Given a certain level of pressure by an onshore country, there is less
lobbying per country in the case with multiple tax havens, relative to the case with one
tax haven only. However, aggregate lobbying increases.
The reason thereof is closely related to a public good problem: For the case of one
tax haven, γ∗ is optimal. However, when a second tax haven enters the game, there is a
free-riding incentive for the first tax haven. The first offshore country anticipates that
the second country also contributes some lobbying. As I assume symmetric countries,
both countries each contribute the same level that is below the efficient level for the
single tax haven case, however, this effect is of second order relative to the mechanical
doubling of lobbying efforts.
From an intuitive point of view this seems likely as well. If there are two countries in
a supranational organization that both lobby for the existence of tax havens, individual
efforts need not to be as big as if there was only one country lobbying. At the same
time, the overall effort is bigger.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have emphasized the role of international lobbying in the fight against
tax havens. To this end, I employed a three stage, two country model in which the
onshore country and offshore country decide about pressure and lobbying before setting
their respective tax rates. Lastly, onshore multinational firms decide whether to shift
profits or not.
In this context, international lobbying is found to decrease the onshore country’s
benefit to apply pressure and is thus an important tool used by offshore countries to
attenuate the negative effects associated with pressure. Only in rare cases, when onshore
governments are over proportionally efficient and able to credibly commit to eliminate
profit shifting, there is no lobbying. If this is not the case, there exists some lobbying.
This result helps to explain the puzzle that despite agreeing to comply with require-
ments in order to be taken off blacklists, there remains scope for international profit
shifting by multinational firms. This is the case, as the effective level of pressure en-
dured by firms is significantly below the level intended by the onshore governments.
Furthermore, I show that early stages of international integration might potentially
reduce profit shifting, if general tax incentives change at a relatively high pace. Eco-
nomic integration exerts more pressure on the level of onshore taxation than it reduces
profit shifting incentives. Assuming that this threshold has already been passed, further
improving capital mobility within Europe will fuel profit shifting. In this respect, acces-
sions to the European Union may give rise to suitable setups to empirically examine a
reduction in international frictions and to confirm the theoretical predictions.
When generalizing the model to allow for a second tax haven, there is evidence that
an adding up effect of lobbying takes place. Despite some free-riding among tax havens,
the overall lobbying that onshore countries face is higher than in the case with only one
tax haven. For an increasing number of tax havens, the onshore country also increases
its pressure level, as the marginal benefit of pressure is higher than in the case with one
haven only.
Starting from these new results, there is ample scope for future research. One example
could be an examination of a generalized model with heterogeneous offshore countries, as
defined by their obtainable share of profits. Here, one might assume that heterogeneity in
tax haven size leads to an increase in the level of pressure applied, relative to the original
case. Furthermore, regarding potential free-riding within international organizations,
adding a second onshore country promises useful insights.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Full pressure efficiency and properties of γ∗
Efficiency of αup This section shows why equation (11) leads to γ∗ = 1 if α = αup, i.e.
if the onshore country uses the upper boundary of pressure, there is no lobbying by the
offshore country. Taking equation (11b) as a starting point, one can plug in the upper




































As the second part on both sides evaporates, the last line is true only if γ = 1.
Therefore, the case of upper boundary pressure (with x = 0 and ft = 0) implies no
lobbying by the offshore country, irrespective of its efficiency level ρ. Also intuitively
this makes sense: if the onshore country commits to eliminate profit shifting and thereby
leads to no tax revenue for the offshore country, conducting expensive profit shifting is
dominated by not doing anything.
Parameter restrictions One might also be concerned whether γ∗ exceeds values of one






9khρ− 2αk − 2α2h+ 2α2h
9khρ− 2α2h
(33a)




As is visible from equation (33b), γ is one, i.e. the second term vanishes, if αup = k
h
.
It is also rather straightforward that for any values below αup, γ is lower than one. This
is the case as 2αk > 2α2h ∀ α ∈ (0; k
h
).









This ensures that both the numerator in equation (33a) and the denominator in equation
(33b) are always larger than zero.
A-1
A.2. Comparative statics
As the equilibrium values of γ∗ and α∗ are only implicitly given, the implicit function
theorem is necessary to evaluate the comparative statics for the given equilibrium values.













































In order to arrive at conditions for this determinant to be either positive or negative,

































T 0 . (35)




The second part has to be negative: Assuming that one starts at the equilibrium value of
γ, an increase in γ leads to a negative first order condition, as lowering γ further yields




, i.e. if the effective
pressure component on the firm relative to financial market frictions is smaller in size
than 1
2h
. The last term is unambiguously positive.
Assuming that direct effects are larger in size than indirect ones, |D| > 0 is used for
further computations.
A-2
